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1. The Constitution Thesis
Organisms are born; they die; they mate. These events change the make-up of organism-ensembles. 
Organisms enter an ensemble when they are born and exit when they die; by mating, organisms  determine 
what kind of individual enters  by a subsequent birth. This  is  how births, deaths  and matings  influence the 
make-up of organism-ensembles. Since evolution consists of changes  to the make-up of organism-
ensembles, let us  call these events individual-level selection events  or ILSEs. (The significance of the term 
‘selection’ will become evident in a moment.) There are other kinds  of ILSE – e.g., migration – but we need 
not worry about them here.
Organism-ensembles  also change. For instance, suppose that we have an ensemble of 100 organisms, 
evenly divided into two kinds, K and K′. An organism of kind K (call it Kris) is  killed by a predator; in the 
meanwhile, an organism of kind K′ (call it Kristie) is  born. If there are no other births  or deaths, there are 
now 49 organisms  of kind K, and 51 of kind K′. Kind K′ has  proportionately increased relative to kind K. 
This change of ensemble-wide proportions  is  an ensemble-level selection event or ELSE. That is, it is  a 
change involving an ensemble of  individual organisms. 
What is  the cause of this  ELSE? Nothing other than that the predator killed Kris, and that Kristie 
became pregnant. That is: nothing other than ILSEs. After Kris’s  death and Kristie’s  birth – these events  are 
both ILSEs  – the ensemble-proportions  change as  a merely mathematical consequence. To put it in another 
way, the ensemble-level change is  mere bookkeeping (cf. Walsh 2004); the causes of change are to be found 
at the individual level. It is  because Kris’s  death and Kristie’s  birth result in changes  in ensemble-level 
proportions that I call them individual-level selection events. 
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The statistical interpretation of the Theory of Natural Selection claims that natural selection 
and drift are statistical features  of mathematical aggregates  of individual-level events. Natural 
selection and drift are not themselves causes. The statistical interpretation is  motivated by a 
metaphysical conception of individual priority. Recently, Millstein, Skipper, and Dietrich 
(2009) have argued (a) that natural selection and drift are physical processes, and (b) that the 
statistical interpretation rests  on a misconception of the role of mathematics  in biology. Both 
theses are contested.
MATTHEN, M. — WHAT IS DRIFT? 2
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
Let me make a metaphysical thesis of  this:  
Ensemble-level selection events are constituted without remainder by individual-level selection events; consequently, the 
causes of  ELSEs are the causes of  the ILSEs that constitute them. Thus, ELSEs are wholly caused by ILSEs.
Call this  the Constitution Thesis. The Constitution Thesis  is  true because there is  no need for an irreducibly 
ensemble-level cause to bring about frequency-changes. Indeed, it is  difficult to see how there could be an 
irreducibly ensemble-level cause of frequency changes. A frequency change is, after all, wholly constituted 
by additions  and deletions of individuals  – there is  no other way to bring it about. Additions  and deletions  of 
individuals  have individual causes  – a predator catches  prey; two individuals mate. So the Constitution 
Thesis  should not be construed as  “an extreme form of nominalism” (as  one referee disquietedly 
murmured). It is  a simple consequence of the truism that frequency-changes  are wholly constituted by 
additions and deletions of  individuals. 
The Constitution Thesis  is not defeated by the following maneuver. Consider the following 
characterization of the Kris-Kristie scenario: more Ks  than K′s  were killed by predators; more K′-producing 
matings  occurred than K-producing matings. This is  an ensemble level characterization of the cause of the 
ELSE we are considering – namely that the proportion of K′s  increased relative to Ks. Is  there an ensemble-
level event corresponding to this  redescription, and if so does  it defeat the claim that “ELSEs are wholly 
caused by ILSEs”? Not in my view. The ensemble-level event just described is  wholly constituted by the 
individual-level events we have been considering.
Remember: ensembles  are just pluralities. Suppose there are two pencils  on my desk, and I push them 
both to the back of the desk. A lover-of-ensembles might insist that the plurality of pencils  in my desk now 
has  a different mean position. And he might insist that there is  an ensemble-level cause of this  ensemble-
level event. My response to this  challenge is  to assent politely – but to add the codicil that the ensemble-level 
cause is wholly constituted by my pushes on the pencils.
It should therefore be noted that the Constitution Thesis  is  about ensembles (i.e., pluralities) not 
populations. Populations  are causally connected networks of conspecific organisms; ensembles  are merely 
collections of organisms. The claim that I want to defend below is  that what evolutionary biologists  call 
“random genetic drift” is  a statistical feature of ensembles (see Matthen 2009 for a fuller argument). Drift 
can occur in an ensemble consisting of 1000 organisms  that co-inhabit a locale and interact with each other 
– i.e., organisms  who all belong to the same population. It can also occur in an ensemble consisting of 1000 
organisms  no two of which belong to the same species or reside in the same locale. It can even occur in an 
ensemble consisting of ensembles  – there may be an expectation of how many of these ensembles  go 
extinct, and this  expectation may be defeated. Drift depends on the laws  of mathematical statistics, not on 
causal interactions between organisms.
2. The Principle of  Natural Selection 
Some organisms  possess  heritable characteristics  that make it easier for them to leave more descendants 
than others with different heritable characteristics. In ensembles, it is  likely, but not certain, that the kinds 
better endowed for abundant reproduction will increase in numbers  relative to those who are less  so. (The 
term ‘better endowed for abundant reproduction’ is  used here as  a stand-in for the population-genetics term, 
‘fitter’. I want to skirt the controversies  that attend the use of the latter term, and I will not say more about 
what makes an organism or a type fit.) 
Why? Because if it is  probable (but not certain) that any organism of kind K will leave more 
descendants  behind than one of kind K′, then it is  probable (but not certain) that in a collection of 
organisms, the total number of descendants  left by K-type individuals  will exceed the number of those left 
by K′-type individuals. (This  is  a consequence of what one might call the probability-frequency rule: more 
probable events probably occur more frequently than less  probable events.) This will lead to a greater 
proportion of  K-type individuals. This simple mathematical truth is the Principle of  Natural Selection. 
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According to what I shall call the Crude Statistical Interpretation of the Principle of Natural Selection, 
the causes  of the increase of better endowed kinds  are none other than the causes  of births, deaths, and 
matings  of individual organisms. The Crude Statistical Interpretation relies  on the Constitution Principle 
above. The increase of K-type individuals relative to K′-type individuals  is  an ELSE: that is, it is  a fact or 
event concerning an ensemble. By the Constitution Thesis, it is  wholly caused by ILSEs. In other words, the 
increase in K-type individuals  is  wholly caused by the individual births, deaths, and matings  that occur 
within the relevant ensemble.
The statistical interpretation does  not reify natural selection. Natural selection is  not a cause of these 
ensemble-level changes. Indeed, it is  not a process  or event or force – it is  not the kind of thing that could be 
a cause. ILSEs  cause ensemble-level change. The Theory of Natural Selection is  a theory about expectations 
regarding how the course of individual-level events  will influence ensemble-level proportions. The Theory 
does not posit causes of  its own.
What then is  drift? I said earlier that when one kind is  better endowed than another for abundant 
reproduction, that kind is  likely, but not certain, to increase proportionately to the other. Statistically 
speaking, one might expect the better endowed kind to increase, but such expectations  can be (and often are) 
violated in actual fact. Departures  from expected values  are what population geneticists  call ‘drift’. (This  use 
of the term overlooks  an important distinction due to Roberta Millstein, and I will refine my terminology in 
the next section.) What is  it that causes  kind K′ to increase relative to kind K despite the latter being better 
endowed? On this  point too, the statistical interpretation stands firm. The Constitution Thesis  forbids  a 
search for ensemble-level causes  of ensemble-level changes  of frequency – at least of ensemble-level causes 
that are not wholly constituted by ILSEs. The causes  are all at the individual level. In particular, it is  a 
mistake to look for a process that acts on ensembles, processes entitled ‘drift’ or ‘natural selection’.
Now, the Crude Statistical Interpretation stands  in need of some nuance. In particular, the statement 
that “the causes  are all at the individual level” needs  qualification (cf. Matthen and Ariew 2009). Moreover, 
there are some population-level effects  in natural selection. But leave this  aside. The broad-brush 
characterization given above is  good enough for the purposes  of this  article. All that is  important here is  the 
statement that terminates  the preceding paragraph, namely that ‘drift’ and ‘natural selection’ are not names 
of  ensemble-level causes. All versions of  the statistical interpretation, whether crude or refined, hold this.
3. The Process Interpretation 
In a recent paper, Roberta Millstein, Robert Skipper, and Michael Dietrich (2009) – henceforth MSD09 
– argue that random genetic drift is  “a physical process where heritable physical differences  between entities 
are causally irrelevant to differences in reproductive success” (p. 2; page numbers  refer to the pdf version of 
the article). This  goes  against the statistical interpretation. In the statistical interpretation, drift is  a departure 
from expected values  attributable to the uncertainty inherent in the expectations  outlined above. This 
uncertainty is  inherent in any series  of births, deaths, and matings. It is  not a separate “physical process” 
over and above the individual-level causes  of such events. As  a proponent of the statistical interpretation, I 
shall query the philosophical motivation of  the process view articulated in MSD09. 
Roberta Millstein (2002) makes  an important distinction between “drift as  outcome” and “drift as 
process”. Drift-as-outcome is  a departure from the expected results  of selection. Drift-as-process  is  the cause 
of such departures. But what is the cause of departures  from expected values? Such a departure might be 
something like the following. Suppose we have a population consisting of half Ks and half K′s. Suppose 
further that K and K′ are equally fit. We expect that at some future time, the population will consist of 50% 
Ks  and 50% K′s. Say that in fact it consists  of exactly 40Ks  and 60K′s  at this  later time. Then we could say 
that the K-drift (as outcome) is  -10, and K′-drift is  +10. (We needn’t worry here about normalizing this  to 
the ensemble.) What is  the cause of this? This  cause is, according to Millstein, drift-as-process. Note that, 
according to the crude statistical interpretation, the underlying ILSEs  are the whole cause: that is  to say, 
events such as  the death of Kris  and the birth of Kristie. Note, therefore, that if the drift-as-process  posit is 
to have any bite against the crude statistical interpretation, it has to be accompanied by the thesis  that drift-
as-process is not wholly constituted by ILSEs of  the sort just mentioned.
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MSD09 cites three quotations from biology text-books to set up their process interpretation.
◆ Douglas  Futuyma: “The genes  included in any generation, whether in newly formed zygotes or in 
offspring that survive to reproduce, are a sample of the genes  carried by the previous  generation. Any 
sample is  subject to random variation, or sampling error” (p. 2; all quotations  are taken from MSD09; I have 
not verified them at their source). According to the authors  of MSD09, “sampling error” here is  drift-as-
outcome. Then they remark: “Futuyma invokes  indiscriminate parent sampling by giving an example where 
changes in gene frequency in a population of snails  are the result of being squished by cows, a process  in 
which the color of the snails  is causally irrelevant.” The idea seems  to be this: since any type of snail is  just 
as  likely as any other to be squished by a cow, one would expect all snail-types  to be equally affected by the 
cows. In other words, cow-squishing is  a “indiscriminate physical process”. Now, it may turn out that some 
types  of snail are, by chance, more affected by cow-trampling than others. This  distorts the effects  of 
selection. 
◆ Continuing: “(Joan) Roughgarden similarly explains  indiscriminate gamete sampling in a finite 
population before asserting, “Genetic drift is  the name for changes  in gene frequency caused by this 
sampling error” (p. 2). The point of this  quote is  difficult to understand. Earlier, “sampling error” was 
(correctly) identified as  drift-as-outcome. Here, it is  given as  the cause thereof. Nonetheless, note that 
Roughgarden speaks  of causes, but we are not told clearly what she takes the causes  of drift-as-outcome to 
be.
◆ Finally, a quote from Mark Ridley: “When selection is  acting at a locus, random sampling also 
influences  the change in gene frequencies  between generations” (p. 2). Here, “random sampling” seems  to be 
the cause of  drift-as-outcome.
MSD09 summarize: “for all three of these biologists, drift is  indeed partially characterized as  an 
outcome (a change in gene frequencies), but it is  an outcome caused by a certain type of physical process 
(indiscriminate parent or gamete sampling) – not as  outcome alone” (p. 3; italics  in the original). (Actually, 
this  is  false: Roughgarden confusedly posits  sampling error as  a cause; Ridley seems  to come close to the 
same error, but his  use of the term ‘random’ is  amplified by the authors  into a full-blown theory of drift-as-
process.)
The question is  this. What is  there in any of the above quotes  to suggest that random sampling is  a 
physical process, or any kind of process, for that matter? The only physical events  cited here are cow-
tramplings, and these are indeed indiscriminate. It seems  that MSD09 identifies  cow-trampling with drift-as-
process  in this  particular case. But they have no support from their texts, at least as  far as  these texts are 
quoted. 
4. Two Views of  Drift  
Taking Millstein’s  distinction between drift-as-outcome and drift-as-process  on board, here’s  the picture 
that seems to emerge from MSD09. Suppose that there is  selection in favor of A-colored snails  as  against B-
colored snails  because the A-type is  better camouflaged against predator-birds. According to MSD09, this 
would be a discriminating physical process: it affects  different types  differently. (Some philosophers take such 
processes  to be selection, as  Walsh 2004, p. 352, and footnote 15, shows.) In this  ensemble, there are also 
various  other “processes” at work – cow-trampling is  one of them. Now, let’s  suppose that this  is  an infinite 
ensemble. Then indiscriminate processes  such as  cow-trampling would affect snail-types  exactly equally. 
(This  follows  directly from definition of ‘indiscriminate’.) Accordingly, cow-trampling would not distort the 
outcome of selection. In finite ensembles, by contrast, the expected outcome might not actually occur 
because, by chance, a larger proportion of A-type snails  may happen to be knocked out by trampling cows. 
Thus, cow-trampling brings  about the unexpected outcome – i.e., it brings  about drift-as-outcome. So, cow-
trampling is  drift-as-process. The position just outlined is  the process  interpretation. This  process 
interpretation is, for three reasons, metaphysically misguided. 
First, it is  unclear why indiscriminate physical processes  should be invoked to explain unexpected results. 
For every cause of death, whether discriminate or indiscriminate, there is an expected result. In the case of 
poor-camouflage predation, the expected result is  a decline of B-colored snails. In the case of cow-
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trampling, the expected result is  an equal effect on snails  regardless  of color. The process interpretation cites 
indiscriminate processes  as  the root cause of unexpected results  in selection. But these indiscriminate 
processes  can do this work only if they themselves  culminate in unexpected values  – for they interfere with 
selection only when, contrary to expectation, they affect different types unequally. The question is: what 
accounts  for unexpected results  in cow-trampling and other such indiscriminate processes? The process 
interpretation has no answer.
Notice that the statistical interpretation does  not face this  difficulty. It holds  that there can be 
uncertainty in the results of any process, discriminate or indiscriminate. (I won’t address  here the question of 
where this uncertainty comes from. See, however, Matthen 2009.)
Second, consider exactly the same physical factors  acting in finite and infinite ensembles. In infinite 
ensembles, as noted before, there would be no drift-as-outcome – the results  would conform to expectations. 
But there would (by the stipulation that the same factors are at work) nevertheless  be cow-trampling. So 
there is drift-as-process  in the infinite ensemble – remember, cow-trampling is  drift-as-process  in the process 
interpretation – but no drift-as-outcome. Drift-as-process  is  at work in all ensembles, according to this  view, 
but it produces  drift-as-outcome only in finite ensembles. This  implies  that indiscriminate sampling cannot 
explain drift-as-outcome by itself. Ensemble size is  needed as  well. But once ensemble size is  invoked, the 
indiscriminate/discriminate distinction becomes  irrelevant. Both kinds  of process  depart from the expected 
in exactly the same fashion for exactly the same (statistical) reasons. 
Once again, note that the statistical interpretation does  not face this difficulty. Mathematical statistics 
proves that the smaller a population, the greater the probability of an unexpected result. And this  is  true 
whether a process is discriminate or indiscriminate. 
Finally, why is  something like cow-trampling a process? I understand a process to be the propagation of 
a single causal influence. You switch the heat on under a kettle and after some time, the water in the kettle 
boils. This  is a process  because it is  the propagation of heat from the burner. Let a ball free on an inclined 
plane and it rolls  to the bottom. This  is  a process  because the action of gravity on the ball propels  it down its 
path. In cases  like this, unified causal influences  play themselves  out on some object or objects. Cow-
tramples, by contrast, are disconnected events. Daisy the cow grazes  on her patch of grass, trampling on 
some snails  as  she does  so; Betsy, another cow, grazes on a different patch of grass, trampling other snails  as 
she goes. Daisy does  not influence Betsy; Betsy does  not influence Daisy. This  is  like two pots  of water on 
two burners  – they both come to the boil, but there is  no one process. In the same way: why would Daisy-
Betsy be considered a single process? 
The statistical interpretation, of course, aggregates  these events: it counts  up the deaths  of snails  and the 
numerical consequences thereof. But it has  no reason to unify these events. According to the statistical 
interpretation, these aggregates  consist of events, many of which are independent of others. Such 
collections of events  are merely aggregates  – “heaps” of events  collected together for some extrinsic reason 
(such as  co-location) or no reason at all. (Refined statistical interpretations, such as that offered in Matthen 
and Ariew 2002, 2009, do allow for some ensemble-level causes  in a derivative way – not natural selection or 
drift though.)
5. Conclusion 
MSD09 entitle the statistical interpretation the “Drift as Outcome Alone” view, which they archly 
abbreviate “DOA”. (For readers fortunate enough to be unfamiliar with North American hospital jargon, 
“DOA” stands  for “Dead On Arrival”.) This would have been more accurately put in this  way: no cause of 
drift except those wholly constituted by ILSEs. Of course, NCODETWCBILSE is  not as  wittily derisive as 
DOA.
And they say: “Since DOA cannot be justified by an appeal to common conceptions  among biologists 
and philosophers, the most charitable interpretation is  that DOA is  in accord with the mathematical models 
of drift” (p. 4). According to MSD09, the statistical interpretation is  unconcerned with the physical reality of 
natural selection and drift. MSD09 makes  much of the contention that “the biologists  who developed the 
mathematical models  of drift did so with the intention of modeling physical processes  (the indiscriminate 
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sampling processes) that they took to be occurring in nature” (p. 7, italics  in the original). Accordingly, the 
statistical interpretation is  criticized as follows: “it is a mistake to think that we can glean definitions  of drift 
from mathematics alone” (p. 5).
All of this  is  highly misleading. The statistical interpretation fully recognizes  that a mathematical-
statistics  model represents  biological reality, but does  not constitute it; it knows that the assumptions  that lie 
behind a statistical model must reflect the biological reality that is  being modeled or represented. It is hard to 
see how anybody could think otherwise. The statistical interpretation is  driven, at least in its  crude form, by 
the Constitution Thesis, and similar metaphysical assumptions, as  well as  by various  theses  concerning 
causation that I have not discussed here. (See, however, Matthen and Ariew 2002, 2009.) There is  no need at 
all for a “charitable interpretation”: what is  needed is  an argument against the Constitution Thesis  or 
against this  application, or against the notions of causation employed by proponents of the statistical 
interpretation. Millstein (2006) appears perfectly well aware of this; so it is  hard to see why this  “charitable 
interpretation” scat is being sung here. 
However that may be, Shapiro and Sober (2007) argue against the Crude Statistical Interpretation’s  use 
of the Constitution Thesis, and Millstein (2006) offers  some reflections  on natural selection and causation – 
both more cogent than MSD09. Matthen and Ariew (2009) contains rejoinders to both. 
The statistical interpretation is  concerned with physical reality: it simply holds  that natural selection and 
drift are best understood in terms  of the statistical properties  of mathematical aggregations  of individual-
level selection events. Physical reality is  to be found in the causes of these ILSEs. In some refined statistical 
interpretations, causes  (but derivative, not physical, causes) are to be found also at the ensemble level. But 
natural selection and drift are not processes in any statistical interpretation.
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